Here are chapters 21–25 of our Easy Game summary:
Chapter 21: Advanced Bet Sizing
In chapter 21, Andrew Seidman argues that bet sizing is primarily psychological rather than mathematical. Larger bets do not automatically create more folds simply because of worse pot odds.
His core model:
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Large bets reinforce what opponents were already leaning toward doing.
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Small bets introduce doubt and can shift decisions.
Large Bets
When an opponent is leaning toward calling, a large bet often strengthens that commitment—especially if they interpret it as polarized. Conversely, if they are leaning toward folding, a large bet can push them decisively toward that fold.
Large sizing amplifies prior intent rather than changing it.
Small Bets
Smaller bets create ambiguity. They may:
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Induce calls from players considering folding.
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Cause marginal bluff-catchers to reconsider and fold.
Small sizing disrupts certainty, sometimes productively and sometimes not.
Practical Applications
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Overbet bluffs work best when opponents are already inclined to fold.
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Overbet value works best against players who dislike folding.
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Thin value may require smaller sizing to avoid triggering unnecessary folds.
There is no universally correct size. The correct bet aligns with how your opponent thinks and what they are predisposed to do.
The takeaway: advanced sizing shapes perception rather than relying purely on pot odds.
Chapter 22: Balance and the Either/Or Philosophy
In chapter 22, Andrew Seidman defines balance as maintaining equal proportions of value hands and bluffs for a given line. Balanced play makes opponents indifferent and protects against exploitation.
However, pure balance does not maximize profit against weaker or unbalanced opponents. Exploiting mistakes requires deliberate imbalance.
He introduces the Either/Or Philosophy:
If a spot is good for value-betting, it is usually not good for bluffing—and vice versa.
This serves as a diagnostic tool:
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On boards where opponents continue widely, prioritize value and reduce bluffs.
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In high fold-equity spots, prioritize bluffs and reduce thin value.
There are rare exceptions where the same line works well for both value and bluffs, usually in polarized, capped-range scenarios.
The strategic lesson is to identify where value and bluff lines diverge and adjust frequencies accordingly. Balance protects; exploitation profits.
Chapter 23: Advanced Street Projection and Two-Way Bets
In chapter 23, Andrew Seidman expands street projection into a forward-planning system and introduces the concept of two-way bets.
The Very Best Fold (VBF)
He proposes identifying the Very Best Fold (VBF)—the strongest hand you can realistically make your opponent fold.
There are two forms:
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Static VBF – What folds if the board does not change favorably.
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Dynamic VBF – What folds if future cards improve your perceived range.
On dynamic boards with potential scare cards, fold thresholds rise across streets. Strong hands that never fold on the flop may fold on the river after sustained pressure.
Planning must reflect how ranges evolve. Bluffing hands that would have folded earlier is ineffective because those hands no longer exist in the range.
Two-Way Bets
Two-way bets simultaneously:
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Extract value from worse hands.
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Induce incorrect folds from better or marginal hands.
Examples include:
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Draws that fold out small pairs while getting called by weaker draws.
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Flop bets that gain value now and set up future barrels.
This reframing blurs the strict separation between value and bluffing.
The central message: plan entire hand trees in advance and recognize when bets accomplish layered objectives.
Chapter 24: Value-Betting vs. Value-Owning
In chapter 24, Andrew Seidman examines how disciplined regulars often overapply two rules: extract thin value and avoid paying off big bets.
These tendencies create exploitable patterns:
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Overfolding to heavy aggression.
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Reluctance to call large river bets.
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Predictable thin value attempts.
Against such players:
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Multi-street bluffs become profitable.
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River aggression targets capped ranges effectively.
However, Seidman cautions against excessive slowplaying. On early streets, aggressive opponents often respond forcefully to aggression. Betting strong hands early can generate more value than trapping.
A hybrid approach often works best:
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Aggressive bluffs.
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Selective passivity with strong value on later streets.
Monitoring whether value bets are getting paid provides guidance on when adjustments are needed.
The takeaway is timing: extract value when aggression induces action, and allow bluffs when opponents fear paying off.
Chapter 25: Image, Preflop and Postflop
In chapter 25, Andrew Seidman explains that solid “A-B-C” poker eventually becomes insufficient at higher stakes. Predictable fundamentals break even against competent opponents.
Image is defined as deliberately shaping how opponents perceive you in order to induce mistakes.
Preflop Image
Constructed through:
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Frequent 3-bets.
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Selective 4-bets.
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Wider opens.
Preflop image is easier to create because ranges are clearer. Opponents often overreact, misjudging how loose your overall strategy actually is.
Postflop Image
More complex and board-dependent. It may involve:
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Check-raises.
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Floats.
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Turn and river aggression.
Expanding your perceived range—by including both value hands and credible bluffs—forces opponents into uncertainty.
The strategic progression is clear:
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A-B-C poker beats weak players.
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Image-driven strategy exploits strong ones.
At advanced levels, controlled unpredictability becomes a key advantage. Image is not random aggression—it is deliberate manipulation of perception to create profitable errors.