Chapter 10 of Play Optimal Poker 2 by Andrew Brokos: Continuation Betting From Out Of Position

In chapter 10 of Play Optimal Poker 2, Andrew Brokos shows how continuation betting strategy changes dramatically when the pre-flop raiser is out of position against an in-position cold caller, rather than against the big blind, and why many “standard” cbets are actually bad in these spots.

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1. Big Picture: UTG vs Button Is Not UTG vs Big Blind

The chapter compares:

• Opal: raises UTG,

• Ivan: calls on the button,

• Flop: J♠ 8♦ 6♦, about $13 in the pot and deep stacks behind.

Key structural differences from the earlier UTG vs BB scenarios:

• The Button cold-calling range should be strong:

  • He gets worse pot odds than the BB,

  • Risk of squeezes behind,

  • So he should defend with tighter, better hands.

• Ranges are much closer in strength than UTG vs BB:

  • Ivan even has a slight equity edge on this flop (~52% vs ~48%).

• Position becomes hugely valuable on a dynamic board like J♠ 8♦ 6♦:

  • Many turn/river cards can change who has the best hand,

  • The in-position player can adjust more accurately as the board evolves.

Result: a lot of “standard” cbets that work against a big blind caller are not justified here versus a strong button caller.

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2. Equity, Nuts Advantage, and the Dynamic Nature of the Board

On J♠ 8♦ 6♦:

• Equity:

  • Ivan (Button) has a small equity advantage.

• Nuts advantage:

  • It’s murky on the flop: Opal has overpairs; Ivan has more suited/connected stuff.

  • But Brokos emphasizes that on such a swingy board, what matters more is:

    • Who will have more nutty holdings on turns and rivers, not just on the flop.

He contrasts two turn types conceptually:

• A static turn like K♦:

  • Can lock in a very clear best hand (e.g. strong flush),

  • Many flop hands become virtually dead.

• A still-dynamic turn like 2♠:

  • Leaves many river cards that can change things,

  • Makes it harder to plan huge polarized bets early.

On these kinds of boards, position magnifies EV: the in-position player gets to see how OOP reacts to changing textures before committing big money.

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3. Shocking Result: UTG Checks 100% on J♠ 8♦ 6♦ vs Strong Button Range

Given:

• UTG (Opal) vs a solid, tight Button calling range,

• Flop J♠ 8♦ 6♦ with lots of draws and possible big hands,

the equilibrium solution:

• Opal checks her entire range on the flop.

Why?

1. She has no real equity edge:

   • Against BB callers she can bet small to deny equity from trashy hands,

   • Against a strong button range, she is the one with more marginal hands.

2. “Take it down now” thinking is flawed:

   • You can’t force your opponent to fold the hands you want to fold.

   • Strong draws (e.g. T9, good diamond draws) will not fold even to huge bets.

   • Big bets are hard to balance: they become strong pairs + strong draws only, making it easy for a competent opponent to defend well.

3. AA / AJ / overpairs are strong but fragile on many turns:

   • There’s no reward for “having the best hand on the flop” if you build a pot you regret on many turns.

   • By checking:

     • Opal keeps the pot manageable,

     • Waits to see the turn card,

     • Then decides whether it’s a good board to grow the pot with strong hands.

So in this balanced, strong-range vs strong-range configuration, auto-cbetting is a mistake. The “standard cbet” heuristic assumes something closer to UTG vs BB, not UTG vs Button.

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4. When UTG Checks, Button Effectively “Continuation Bets” Small

Once Opal checks:

• Ivan (Button) now has the option:

  • Check back,

  • Bet small (~33% pot),

  • Bet larger (~75% pot).

Equilibrium behavior:

• Small bet ($4 into $13) ~ 69% of the time,

• Large bet ($10) very rarely (~4%),

• Checks the rest.

Why small bets?

• He has a slight range advantage plus position.

• The small sizing:

  • Puts pressure on Opal’s marginal hands (like A♥Q♥-type holdings),

  • Forces her either to:

    • Put money in with hands that will struggle later, or

    • Fold away non-trivial equity.

• He does not have a big nuts advantage yet:

  • So large, polar bets on the flop are less attractive.

  • Bigger polarized betting comes later on certain turns/rivers.

In effect, Ivan’s small bet functions like a cbet with positional edge, despite being the caller pre-flop.

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5. How Opal Responds: Check-Raises, Calls, and Equity Realization

Facing Opal’s flop check and a small $4 bet from Ivan:

• She never leads (donk bets) in this main equilibrium model; all her aggression is via check-raises.

• Her check-raising range (~13% of hands) is built from:

  • Strong made hands (sets, straights, strong two pair),

  • Strong draws:

    • T9,

    • Big diamond draws,

    • Some AQ with a diamond or diamond blocker (not for value, but as a future bluff line).

Her calling range:

• Includes:

  • Decent one-pair hands,

  • Some overcards with draws or good backdoor potential (KQ with a diamond, K♠T♠, etc.),

  • Hands like 77 especially when they carry a diamond, since backdoor flushes or straights give extra ways to win.

Key points:

• Her weakest calls are high-card hands with some backdoor potential.

• She rarely folds completely hopeless stuff if she has useful backdoors (e.g. heart or diamond that can allow future semi-bluffs).

On later streets, this mixed call/raise/fold structure makes it hard for Ivan to bluff profitably: he never knows if her check-call line is “weak” or laying a trap.

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6. Turn Play: Ivan Does Not Barrel Automatically

If:

• Opal checks,

• Calls the $4 flop bet,

• Then checks again on the turn,

Ivan’s average behavior across turns:

• Checks more than half the time (~55% on average).

• Even on his best turn cards, his betting frequency never goes “auto barrel everything”:

  • Lowest checking frequency on any single turn is still about a third.

Implication for Opal (and you, when OOP):

• Check-calling flop does not mean “I’m just folding turn every time.”

• A well-constructed check-call range will:

  • Let you continue on many turns,

  • Sometimes check-raise,

  • Sometimes give up.

• If both players are playing well, turn aggression is selective, not automatic.

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7. New Scenario: Exploiting a Loose Button Caller

Now Opal faces a much looser Button calling range from Ivan — many more weak suited hands and offsuit stuff.

Same flop: J♠ 8♦ 6♦.

Equity and Nuts Advantage Flip Around

• Opal now has clear equity advantage (>55%).

• Ivan:

  • Has more combinations of two pair / weird nuttish stuff,

  • But also far more total air, weak pairs, and junk.

EV-wise:

• Opal’s EV jumps significantly (over $7 from the $13 pot).

• Loose range = “Garbage in, garbage out”:

  • Wider starting range means more total whiffs on the flop,

  • Which Opal can exploit.

Opal’s Flop Strategy Changes Dramatically

Versus the loose range:

• She now bets ~62.5% of her range on the flop.

• She uses both bet sizes, but:

  • The 75% pot bet gets used more than twice as often as the 33% pot bet.

Why larger bets now?

• Ivan’s wide range contains a massive amount of weak/marginal hands.

• To make him indifferent to calling with things like K♠Q♠, she needs more pressure.

• Even though he technically has a nuts advantage (more crazy two-pair combos), that is swamped by:

  • How many weak holdings he has relative to her.

• Her strong one-pair and overpair hands (QQ, AJ, etc.) can be played as thick value/protection bets.

Out of position:

• You cannot pot-control the same way as in position:

  • Checking hands like QQ or AJ “to control the pot” just lets the in-position player decide whether to:

    • Take a free card,

    • Or start building the pot when he chooses.

• So OOP betting ranges become more linear:

  • Many medium-strength, vulnerable hands go into the betting range,

  • Rather than all being protected by checks.

Ivan’s Response As the Loose Caller

When Opal checks in this loose scenario:

• Ivan now has a weaker range than in the tight-caller case.

• He:

  • Bets small (~47% of the time; down from 69%),

  • Still barely uses the large bet (~4%),

  • Checks more often because he simply has more weak holdings.

Opal’s defense vs his small bet:

• Similar structure: strong hands and strong draws check-raise often,

• But she folds less and defends wider:

  • Even hands like AT, KQ, AQ without a backdoor now stay in vs the small bet.

Turn play:

• Ivan still checks around half the time on most turns.

• Large overbets appear mostly on straight-completing turns that favor his range,

• Rarely on flush-completing turns, because:

  • Those are easier for Opal to defend: she can continue with flushes, sets, and strong draws and fold everything else.

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8. Practical Heuristics & Test Situations

The chapter ends with some applied advice via test questions. A few standout ideas:

• If you raise from EP vs Button:

  • You should cbet less often than if you raised from the Cutoff or Button.

• On favorable, relatively dry boards like A♠ 8♦ 6♦ as UTG vs Button:

  • You can still bet a lot (~70% of range),

  • But you should still maintain a checking range:

    • Especially with unimproved medium pairs,

    • And even some top pair with weaker kickers (like A♥T♥) as bluff-catchers.

• On Q♠ 6♦ 4♦ with AA vs Button:

  • Solver mixes between:

    • Bet,

    • Check-call,

    • Check-raise.

  • In practice, check-raising AA can be especially profitable:

    • Humans over-bluff when checked to on these boards,

    • And are too sticky with top pair / good draws.

• Balancing that check-raise line:

  • Use diamond draws,

  • Big overcards with a diamond,

  • Some backdoor-straight-and-flush combos (like A♠5♠, 77),

  • Plus other strong made hands (sets, overpairs, AQ).

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9. Key Lessons from Chapter 10

Brokos distills several big takeaways:

1. In-Position Cold Callers Should Be Strong

• Button calls vs UTG should be much tighter than BB calls:

  • Worse price,

  • More players behind,

  • So range is narrower and stronger.

2. Cbet Frequency Must Drop Dramatically OOP vs Strong IP Range

• With no equity edge and no positional edge, the pre-flop raiser:

  • Should often cbet much less,

  • Sometimes not at all on certain boards (like the baseline J♠ 8♦ 6♦ example).

3. Out-of-Position Betting Ranges Are Less Polar

• When you’re OOP:

  • Checking doesn’t safely “control the pot” — villain can still bet.

  • Therefore:

    • More medium-strength, vulnerable hands should go into your betting range,

    • You check fewer draws and fewer hands that fear many turns.

4. Exploiting Loose Callers: More Value, More Bluffs, More Calls

• The wider your opponent’s calling range pre-flop:

  • The more flops they miss, regardless of texture.

• Against loose callers:

  • Cbet more often,

  • Bluff wider (because they have more nothing),

  • Value bet thinner (because their calling range includes many weak pairs and draws),

  • Bluff-catch more often (because their betting range contains more junk).