Here are chapters 46–50 of our Easy Game summary:
Chapter 46: The Diminishing Medium Value Category
In chapter 46, Andrew Seidman introduces the Diminishing Medium Value Category (DMVC): spots where stack size, leverage, position, and history compress decision trees so much that “medium value” hands barely exist in practice.
He revisits the three categories:
-
Premium value – happy to raise/stack off.
-
Medium value – too strong to fold, not strong enough to raise for clear value.
-
Low value – not worth continuing passively, but fine as a bluff.
DMVC happens when the middle category becomes impractically small.
The classic 100bb, OOP vs 3-bet spot
Example: you open late position with AQ/TT, a good reg 3-bets on the button, and you’re OOP at ~100bb. These hands feel medium, but:
-
calling OOP is hard to realize equity with,
-
balancing an OOP calling range gets complex (you’d need some AA/KK flats, speculative hands, etc.),
-
you’re forced into awkward multi-range strategy.
So high-level players often choose to eliminate the middle with a simplified plan:
-
4-bet or fold
-
4-bet AQ/TT as thin value,
-
4-bet suited wheel aces as thin bluffs,
-
fold the rest.
-
Seidman argues that in many contexts, removing a whole “range” reduces mistakes even if it costs some deception.
Leverage drives the compression
When stacks are shallow relative to the pot, decisions become binary (shove/fold, raise/fold). This shows up preflop and postflop—e.g., on wet boards where a big reraise makes calling with draws unprofitable, turning the decision into shove or fold.
Trade-off
-
Eliminate medium: simpler, fewer mistakes, consistent pressure, but more predictable.
-
Maintain medium: more deception/flexibility, but requires advanced balancing and is easier to misplay.
Core insight: medium value doesn’t always meaningfully exist—especially around 100bb where leverage forces binary choices.
Chapter 47: 4-betting and Depth OOP
In chapter 47, Andrew Seidman explains that deep stacks (200bb+) break 100bb polarization logic when you’re out of position.
At ~100bb OOP vs a 3-bet, a polarized approach (4-bet stack-off hands + folds) is clean because opponents rarely flat 4-bets and calling 3-bets OOP is miserable.
Deep, the environment changes:
-
opponents flat 4-bets in position more often,
-
3-bet ranges widen,
-
calling 3-bets OOP becomes more viable.
Key deep-stack adjustments:
-
4-bet thinner for value
Since opponents call more, hands like AQ/JJ/TT/AJ/KQ gain value. You must accept playing big pots without always having monsters. 4-bet sizing should generally increase because small sizes don’t create meaningful leverage deep. -
Flat 3-bets OOP more
-
Set-mining becomes better due to implied odds and deep barreling.
-
Equity-based hands (suited broadways, suited aces, connected hands) can call and then play aggressively postflop—check-raising and pressing strong/nut draws.
-
-
Reduce weak 4-bet bluffs
Deep, opponents call more and showdown value matters more. Pure air performs badly in deep 4-bet pots.
Core takeaway: at 100bb you can often 4-bet/fold cleanly; deep you need more flexibility—thinner value 4-bets, more OOP flats with playable equity, fewer pure bluffs.
Chapter 48: Adjusting 3-Bet Sizes—What Do You Want?
In chapter 48, Andrew Seidman reframes 3-bet sizing around a single question: what response do you want? Position/player type/stack depth still matter, but sizing is also an image and range-manipulation tool.
The leverage trade-off
-
Bigger 3-bets: deny odds, build pots for value, but create more dead money and invite aggression.
-
Smaller 3-bets: cheaper dead-money collection, often reduce 4-bet incentives, and—most importantly—encourage wider, weaker calls that opponents misplay postflop.
Why smaller 3-bets OOP can be powerful
Against wide openers, smaller sizing can:
-
win more pots at lower cost,
-
face fewer 4-bets,
-
pull in dominated / too-wide calling ranges that make postflop mistakes.
Image-driven sizing
Early in a session, larger bluff 3-bets may get too much respect; later, once you’re seen as active, larger value 3-bets may get paid more. Using multiple sizes can also create confusion that increases mistakes.
Core insight: don’t ask “what’s standard?” Ask “what reaction am I trying to produce—and how does sizing steer them there?”
Chapter 49: Total Game Strategy
In chapter 49, Andrew Seidman argues poker isn’t just a sequence of isolated EV-maximizing choices. Sometimes a slightly negative or marginal play now can create larger positive-EV opportunities later through image, range perception, and game flow.
He defines Total Game Strategy as intentionally shaping future conditions—at the cost of some immediate EV—to increase long-run profitability. This is powerful but easy to misuse: done wrong, it’s just spew and variance.
Examples include:
-
Strengthening your blind calling range by flatting more strong hands (and balancing with some weaker hands). The weak flats may lose a little immediately, but they support stronger future lines: more credible check-raises, more disguised slowplays, and tougher postflop spots for opponents.
-
Explaining how hyper-aggressive styles can win: not because every hand is profitable alone, but because the combined effect (image, fold equity, confusion, credible range width) increases overall EV.
When to apply: when opponents misplay postflop, overfold to pressure, or don’t adjust well to image shifts. Avoid it versus strong, adaptive players who exploit looseness.
Core insight: sometimes you optimize the session/game ecosystem, not the single decision—selectively and with discipline.
Chapter 50: The Mini Stop ‘n Go
In chapter 50, Andrew Seidman introduces the Mini Stop ‘n Go (check-call flop, lead turn). It exploits a common population leak: high flop c-bet frequency but significantly lower turn barreling.
Building a balanced flop check-call range
To use this line well, your flop check-calls must include:
-
Medium hands (too good to fold, not ideal to raise),
-
Draws (especially when raising isn’t best due to opponent tendencies/texture),
-
Very strong hands (select slowplays on dry boards vs straightforward opponents).
Balance matters against good opponents; against weak ones, the line can be used more exploitatively.
Why the turn lead works
After you check-call, many opponents assume you’ll auto-check turn—yet many of them won’t fire again. When the turn reduces their aggression or makes their second barrel unlikely, leading can:
-
capture value that checking might miss,
-
deny equity to hands that would check behind,
-
generate folds from capped or drifting ranges.
Opponent type matters: vs barrely aggressors, checking again may outperform; vs passive opponents, leading often prints.
Core insight: the turn is a new leverage point. Incorporating turn leads after flop check-calls adds pressure, prevents free realization, and forces opponents into lines they play poorly.